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Abstract
While ﬁxture-level disaggregation of water data has a number of applications in decision support systems, it also gives rise to data
privacy risks. This paper presents a system of algorithms that identify and detect water activity events, and then analyse disag-
gregated information to distinguish between privacy-sensitive behaviour and incongruent data due to technical faults or leakages.
The process running in real-time is implemented within the Complex Event Processor (CEP) of WSO2 and the ICeWater project.
Results provide insights of future directions in theoretical aspects of disaggregation, privacy and CEP system implementation.
c© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Scientiﬁc Committee of CCWI 2015.
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1. Introduction
Advances in water sensor communications and ICT-integrated smart city technologies are key drivers for managing
water networks better. An example of such an ICT approach is the ICeWater project, which uses open source WSO2
middleware to support Decision Support Systems (DSS) and heterogeneous sensor infrastructures. However, with the
advent of high granularity Automated Meter Reading (AMR) on customer connections, and the adoption of such data
driven open software platforms, the privacy issues become more pronounced.
There is no single approach to privacy protection emerging in the water domain. This is despite the fact that
similar data protection requirements exist in Europe as this only relates to protecting data of individuals and not
aggregate consumption data. Some countries are taking a stricter approach than others in this respect, for instance
recent legislation in Germany is favouring the adoption of high levels of security for smart metering to protect privacy
as well as preventing tampering or other forms of security attack. However, in other countries no security measures
are mandated at all. In the future with the roll-out of smart metering within individual premises or dwellings the
privacy related issues will need careful consideration to strike the right balance between cost and level of protection.
The main concern with privacy related to the AMR or smart meter data is that third parties can determine or deduce
sensitive information related to the users activities. There is clearly a level of granularity, in time and also in terms of
the number of aggregated users, at which it becomes improbable that third parties could gain any useful information.
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However, this level depends not only on the number of users but on their types of usage and which usage events
are most critical. For instance, if is it easy to determine a shower usage event and it is possible to deduce that a
particular user is the most likely to be causing this event, then it will become more sensitive information. Apart from
the privacy related concerns, there are beneﬁts of being able to identify individual types of usage events in order to
provide feedback to users on how they may be able to save water and energy. For instance, it is important to determine
whether they have ineﬃcient ﬁxtures or customer-side leakage. This is an aspect of water resource management that
can beneﬁt both users and utilities, but needs to have mutual agreement on sharing of the data for this purpose.
While water data privacy has not been studied in prior art, there is a body of work in AMR for electricity data, in
which privacy is deﬁned as a probability of detecting a hidden trace of events, given a perturbed or aggregated signal
containing such events [1]. Further, in privacy-preserving data mining, the statistical metric of diﬀerential privacy [2]
studies a class of privacy perturbations that have negligible eﬀect on publicized statistics.
The reverse problem of privacy is the problem of disaggregation. This involves decomposing an aggregate water
consumption proﬁle into its constituent water consumption proﬁles of individual ﬁxtures or water-related activities
such as meal preparation. As discussed above, one application is to provide customer feedback (e.g. measures to help
minimise excessive water use, identify high ﬂow ﬁxtures, use of tap running are compared with the community). A
further important application for the utilities includes improved demand forecasting.
Existing solutions to this challenge are typically expensive (by installing additional hardware at water pipes before
connecting to ﬁxtures) or they may depend on the analysis of high frequency ﬂow data, e.g. 500 Hz [3]. While similar
promising technologies are based on low-cost ﬂow rate sensing at a lower, but still ﬁne, granularity of 2 Hz, [4], many
existing installations have made a choice of 5–15 minute sampling intervals. In this direction, the development of
machine learning techniques to analyse coarse water data becomes increasingly interesting. While there is little work
in disaggregating coarse water data [5], it is worth noting that there is a rich energy disaggregation literature, a.k.a.
Non-Intrusive Appliance Load Monitoring (NIALM), which typically employs variants of Hidden Markov Models
(HMMs) such as Iterative HMMs [6] and Conditional, Factorial HMMs [7]. A common weakness of these approaches
is that they assume a-priori knowledge of the number of ﬁxtures exhibiting unique proﬁle characteristics. Further, the
eﬀectiveness of learning (training) a complex HMM typically depends on a good choice of initial parameters.
In this paper we focus on bespoke aggregate water data privacy challenges and solutions and we introduce a
lightweight disaggregation, privacy evaluation and incongruence detection algorithm running in real-time within the
Complex Event Processor (CEP) of WSO2. The algorithm comprises of three main parts. The ﬁrst process involves an
unsupervised classiﬁer of ﬁxture-level water events (e.g. sink, washing machine, toilet, and shower). The parameters
of this classiﬁer are trained by mapping density-based clusters of aggregate ﬁltered water data, into proﬁle states of
hypothetical consumption ﬁxtures. The result of this process, may then be used by a range of NIALM algorithms,
contributing towards a realistic, truly unsupervised algorithm. The second process uses the bespoke classiﬁer to detect
particular water events in real time. Finally, the third part analyses the privacy content of disaggregated information
and it provides a guarantee of suﬃcient level of privacy protection through data aggregation. Further, the privacy
algorithm helps distinguish between the detection of atypical water (human) usage behaviour, and incongruent data
due to technical faults or system security attacks. The whole process lends itself to applications in the Smart Grid,
where energy disaggregation and smart meter privacy are also particularly important.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The ICeWater project and forecasting algorithms are discussed in §2;
the methodology and algorithms of this paper are introduced in §3; platform implementation details are provided in
§4; numerical results are given in §5; and conclusions are drawn in §6.
2. The ICeWater project
The ICeWater system is based on a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) communication platform, where a publish
/ subscribe mechanism integrates diverse sensor types with the web services through suitable adapters. However,
integration of DSSs, sensor / meter infrastructure and models tend to be expensive and bespoke solutions are not
ﬂexible or easily scalable. A proposed solution architecture to tackle this problem is currently being implemented
by ICeWater project and deployed to support trials in Timisoara (Romania) and Milan (Italy) [8]. The integration
platform used by ICeWater is based on open source components provided by WSO2 (www.wso2.org). The rationale
behind this approach is that WSO2 functionality is both comprehensive and oﬀers high performance [9].
856   Georgios Kalogridis et al. /  Procedia Engineering  119 ( 2015 )  854 – 863 
Fig. 1. Combination of normality and failure analysis for water AMR data.
ICeWater security is orchestrated by an Integration and Security Layer (ISL), which underpins access control,
service routing and system management. The ISL uses integration platforms oﬀered byWSO2, including the Business
Activity Monitor (BAM), Identity Server (IS), API Manager (APIM), Enterprise Service Bus (ESB), Governance
Registry (GReg), and CEP, which is described further in §4.
2.1. Forecasting and anomaly detection
While the focus of this paper is on disaggregation, incongruence detection and privacy evaluation of water events,
these algorithms may further lend themselves to, and interplay with, demand forecasting. In fact, the premise of this
paper is that demand estimation is an integral part of privacy analytics.
Water consumption forecasting is useful for enabling utilities to optimise pump scheduling taking advantage of
lower energy tariﬀs, plan network and meter replacements and for leakage detection. However, it is a challenge due to
the variation between customers that can occur even within the same locality. The reason for this variation is mostly
dependent on the number of occupants within a dwelling, but also due to work / lifestyle habits. For instance, the
diﬀerence between weekday and weekend consumption patterns is usually signiﬁcant in both residential and business
areas. Some forecasting techniques take into account a number of exogenous variables and also other factors such as
obtained during a census [10]. However, it is also possible to mine the historic consumption data to classify the data
according to the underlying patterns without such knowledge. Typical methods include artiﬁcial neural networks and
regression analysis of data over diﬀerent time periods. Within the ICeWater project a two stage approach has been
developed [11] and at the ﬁrst stage the daily water demand patterns (i.e., time-series of hourly data) are analysed in
order to identify a limited set of typical behaviours, over the time period taken into account. At the second stage, each
dataset is separately analysed to obtain one speciﬁc daily water demand forecasting model, where each daily water
demand forecasting model consists of a set of hourly water demand forecasting models.
The error between the hourly forecast and the actual consumption is the most interesting from the point of view of
detecting anomalies or abnormal events. For instance, the percentage error provides a good indication of a potential
problem (such as leakage or a signiﬁcant demand event). The comparisons can be performed on an individual customer
basis, or on aggregate consumption for groups of customers. In the ICeWater project the diﬀerence between the
prediction and the actual hourly consumption is deﬁned as the ‘normality’ (see Fig. 1). A positive normality indicates
more actual consumption than forecast.
Missing AMR readings are a particular problem when AMR data is collected via a wireless network infrastructure
(which is often the case). This can be caused by radio propagation anomalies or device related performance issues.
Hence combining the normality of readings with the missing data (error) rates for corresponding AMRs permits the
criticality to be calculated. Readings that are consistently close to the predictions (low absolute normality) are not
as critical as readings that are often or recently abnormal. Hence, when determining whether missing readings are
critical or not (i.e. can be reliably predicted) the normality is combined with the time since the last normal reading
was successfully received (deﬁned as severity).
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Fig. 2. Example process of converting volume to VFR and estimating (correcting) a more granular start and end time of a consumption event.
Above: original consumptions data sampled every approx. 5 minutes; below: estimated VFR signature sampled every 1 minute.
3. Methodology
3.1. Problem formulation
The underlying assumption for disaggregating water data readings into a trace of ﬁxtures (or consumption activi-
ties) contributing to these readings, based on which privacy is evaluated, is that a volume of consumed water within
an interval may be used to infer the identity of the combination of activities that consumed this water. To formalise
this claim, suppose that the proﬁle of an ith activity can be represented by a rectangular pulse of certain amplitude
qi(t) ∈ Q ∪ {0}, where Q := {q1, . . . , qM}, 1 ≤ i ≤ M is a set of volumetric ﬂow rates (VFRs) associated with M activ-
ity, and a corresponding pulse duration, Ti. The aggregate VFR can be written as follows: Q(t) =
∑M
i=1 qi(t)ui(t − τi),
where ui(t) is the rectangular pulse of a unit amplitude and duration Ti, τi, and is the pulse shift. Clearly Q(t) can
take 2M diﬀerent values, including 0. If Q(t) is obtained from suﬃciently granular consumption measurements, then
individual activity operation may be identiﬁed with high probability.
The overall method in this paper is adapted and signiﬁcantly extended from [1] which in based on electricity data.
An analogy between electricity and water measurements is drawn by mapping energy and instant power to volume
and VFR, respectively.
3.2. Preprocessing and feature extraction
The reason for which we wish to convert volume data to VFR is that the latter feature characterises better the
proﬁle of a distinct water activity. That is, it is more likely that two ﬁxtures consume the same volume as compared
with consuming at the same ﬂow rate. Further, volume measurements in the data might be irregular; e.g. in our data
the sampling interval varied between 3 and 6 minutes. Thus, the feature of volume does not characterise the activity
at the given timestamp, as opposed to VFR. However, the conversion to VFR is not straightforward because the start
time of a consumption event is not known and thus the same ﬁxture (with a constant VFR) is most likely to consume
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent amounts of volumes in successive measurements. This may be further complicated if more than
one activities start within an interval. Considering this challenges, we process input data as follows. 1) With given
timestamp, convert litres to standard cubic cm per minute (sccm). 2) Synthesise a higher granularity timeline, with
regular one minute samples. 3) Find the starting positions of positive VFR changes triggering a consumption event
occuring in isolated blocks of two, and join the two edges into one. Repeat for negative VFR changes triggering an
end event. 4) Move the VFR edges with a water-ﬁlling algorithm such that the original volume measurements are
satisﬁed and ﬁll in the gaps of the synthesised timeline. An example of this preprocessing is given in Fig. 2.
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−8000 −6000 −4000 −2000 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Dev. 1 : [131 -115 ]sccm, freq=23 dur=39m50s, cons=4.9L
Dev. 2 : [213 -197 ]sccm, freq=26 dur=32m42s, cons=6.7L
Dev. 3 : [534 -521 ]sccm, freq=5 dur=35m36s, cons=18.8L
Dev. 4 : [1222 -1255]sccm, freq=2 dur=9m0s, cons=11.1L
Dev. 5 : [2663 -2633]sccm, freq=30 dur=40m30s, cons=107L
Dev. 6 : [4141 -4141]sccm, freq=2 dur=11m0s, cons=45.6L
Dev. 7 : [7178 -7179]sccm, freq=2 dur=8m30s, cons=61L
1-2-3-stage clustering: 50-42-14 clusters (house 13).
Fig. 3. Learning process that identiﬁes activity proﬁles. Step one (bottom set of clusters) uses DBSCAN to cluster Ot and provides 50 cluster
centres. Step two (middle set of clusters) uses DBSCAN to reduce the cluster centres into 42. Step tree (top level) traces the signal to identify
most likely pairs of clusters that characterise a device FSM. For each pair (FSM) it outputs the [OFF-ON ON-OFF] VRF changes (in sccm),
the frequency of appearance in the training data, the average duration of the cycle (time between ON and OFF states), and the average volume
consumed (in litres). Training period of two weeks was used.
To optimise the operation of the machine learning algorithms we use as features a) the ΔQt changes of VFR that
are signiﬁcant enough, i.e. above a leakage rate / variation of 100 sccm, b) the sum
∑
ΔQt of changes in-between
successive ΔQt values, and c) the indexes of the ΔQt values, which contain the duration between successive ΔQt.
3.3. Training
The real-time disaggregation algorithm depends on the results of a training phase that involves learning the num-
ber and the consumption proﬁles of active water ﬁxtures installed in diﬀerent dwellings. We propose a customised
unsupervised learning algorithm, which majorly advances the method of [12].
A training trace of the objects Ot = {ΔQt,∑ΔQt} is fed into a two-phase non-parametric clustering algorithm that
is based on the DBSCAN clustering algorithm. Fundamentally, the algorithm will (iteratively) ﬁnd cluster centres
(C(ΔQt)) that cluster together objects that are a) within a distance (which we set as a noise threshold of 100 sccm) and
b) have a minimum cluster size (set to four). The learned set of clusters (comprising positive and negative C(ΔQt))
are then analysed in order to identify the best combinations of ON-OFF events that correspond to the states of a Finite
State Machine (FSM) that characterises the proﬁle of a learned activity. Further details of this process is found in
[12]. The three steps of this process (using DBSCAN twice followed by FSM optimisation) for one particular house
are illustrated in Fig. 3. The results of all 25 houses as comparison with ground truth are detailed in §5.
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3.4. Real-time disaggregation
As discussed in the Introduction, here is a range of machine learning algorithms that may be used for NIALM of
coarse data, most of which are based on variants of HMM. In this paper we use a simple method, based on a modiﬁed
version of the knapsack optimisation problem, which we formulate as follows: maximise W(t) =
∑N
i=1
∑s
j=1 wi, j(t)zi, j,
subject to ΔQt −Qn ≤ W(t) ≤ ΔQt +Qn, where ΔQt is the observed VFR, N is the number of FSMs, s = 2 the number
of FSM states, Qn is a tolerance value, and wi, j(t) takes values from {0, 1} with the constrain that ∑si=1 wi, j(t) = 1, for
all j, at any time t. We further set Qn = x−L, where L is a detected minimum (leakage) rate, and 0 ≤ x ≤ xmax(= 400).
To optimise computationally the above problem, we construct an array representing all plausible solutions, in
which we limit the number of concurrent activities to ﬁve. We then construct a lookup table by sorting the solutions
that correspond to a choice of wi, j(t) and the associated W(t). Once constructed, the look-up table allows the detec-
tion algorithm (that follows) to ﬁnd solutions almost instantly (in real-time) while maintaining the validity of FSM
transitions.
This algorithm is chosen over other (HMM-based) ones as we currently have no ground truth of ﬁxture consumption
traces, and we thus we cannot compare performances. The disaggregation results are only used to analyse the privacy
evaluation and incongruence detection methods that follow.
3.5. Privacy and incongruence detection
Adapting from [1], we characterise a behaviour proﬁle with an empirical probability distribution (EPD), which is
deﬁned by the relative frequency of the occurrences of all possible events. Assuming the knowledge of a disaggregated
set of M water activities, there are 2M possible events. For any particular time interval 0 ≤ t ≤ T the number of
occurrences for each event can be counted in order to obtain an interval EPD. Further an expected (average) EPD may
be obtained by counting across a suﬃciently large number of sample paths.
Given a expected EPD Qp, the deviation of an interval EPD Pp from Qp may be measured by functions which are
in general called divergence measures D. Relative entropy, and mutual information are such measures that have been
widely used as a data privacy metric. In this paper we use K-divergence given by K(Pp||Qp) := ∑b Pp(b) log 2Pp(b)Pp(b)+Qp(b) .
The advantages of the K-divergence (KD) as compared to the relative entropy is that it is always deﬁned, for all values
of Pp and Qp, and its value is between zero and one. Using a data mining language, a large KD indicates an atypical
bag of events, and a small KD indicates a typical bag of events. One way to understand this association is to look
at the deﬁnition of KD: each term log 2Pp(b)Pp(b)+Qp(b) will be greater than zero if Pp(b) > Qp(b), and it will be zero if
Pp(b) = Qp(b); otherwise it will be negative. Thus, Pp(b) >> Qp(b) is a suﬃcient condition for a spike in KD.
We support a premise that it is a fundamental privacy need to protect the occurrence of an atypical bag of events
(intervals with high KD). That is, privacy is protected (no leakage) when the information distance between an observed
interval EPD and an expected (average) EPD is small. Clearly, such a requirement is opposite to more classical privacy
deﬁnitions based on data perturbation. To compare this approach with previous ones we make a remark: while one
aspect of privacy is protected if D(P′p||Pp) is increased and thus higher distortions are introduced, another aspect
of privacy is protected when the exposed bag of events is close to the expected one and contains no extraordinary
(rare) events, i.e. the observed interval EPD yields a low D(Pp||Qp). It should be clear that while a KD spike leaks
information of rare events, persistently high values of KD do not necessarily infer low privacy protection; for example,
continuous bags of random events will yield a high KD as compared with the expected one. This principle allows us
to deﬁne a privacy level, as the average to peak ratio of a sequence of interval KD values, and an incongruence level
simply as the average of a sequence of interval KD values.
4. Implementation
CEP is a becoming a widely accepted method for analysing multiple streams of data in order to infer with some
degree of conﬁdence that speciﬁc complex events have taken place. It correlates multiple simple events to detect the
occurrence of complex events which otherwise could not be detected. The process is suited to real time streaming data
scenarios and enables low latency decision making. Valuable information can be extracted from combining multiple
related data streams. For example, in order to detect that a speciﬁc water consuming ﬁxture is being operated when
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the only direct data source is a smart water meter providing a consumption rate, several data streams would need to
be analysed. These may include event duration, event time of day, ambient temperature, water volume consumed and
even consumption of other energy sources like electricity or gas.
We implement the real-time stream processing described in §3 as follows. 1) For each aggregate volume Vt received
and for each unique house ID, estimate the VFR ΔQt, and disaggregate it by recalling the previous disaggregation
result for compliance with FSM transitions. 2) If the timestamp of ΔQt falls within a new hourly timeslot, then a)
build a hourly behaviour pattern proﬁle (for the 1 hour timeslot that has just elapsed), b) compare the hourly pattern
with the expected one, and c) output a privacy and incongruence level (for the hour). 3) If the timestamp of ΔQt falls
within a new day, then a) build a daily behaviour pattern proﬁle (for the day that has just elapsed), b) compare the
daily pattern with the expected one and c) output a privacy and incongruence level (for the day).
The WSO2 CEP implementation is based on the open source Siddhi CEP. The implementation is highly ﬂexible
and supports several data stream source options including Java Message Service brokers, Email and HTTP REST
Calls. Sensors or other supporting systems can deposit raw data using specially deﬁned HTTP endpoints. These
event delivery mechanisms interface with the CEP system through the use of Input Event Adapters. From here simple
events can be captured by extracting data from well-deﬁned data formats such as XML or JSON. The data streams
are continuously monitored for the occurrence of simple events by searching for speciﬁc elements or tags using Event
Builders. Once detected, these simple events are made available to the Siddhi Engine for complex event processing.
Once enough simple events have been collected to indicate an occurrence of a complex event, the complex event is
formatted using an output Event Formatter which allows output events to be generated in several well deﬁned data
formats. An Output Event Adapter is used to deliver this formatted complex event to a database for oﬄine analysis and
/ or other interested entities for low latency decision making. Fig. 4 shows our proposed architecture. XML, HTTP,
and SQL technologies are used to obtain, transmit, extract and store events. The green arrow represents a detected
simple event in the incoming data stream. It represents only one of multiple simple events that would be needed to
produce the complex event shown by the red arrows. The complex event is passed to two separate Output Adapters,
one HTTP and one SQL. This allows the event to be forwarded to additional services such as a web based graphing
or visualisation service and also stored in a standard database for further oﬄine analysis.
As previously described, the system we are proposing has three primary components. 1) The unsupervised ﬁx-
ture/activity classiﬁer which operates on aggregate volumetric ﬂow rate data to generate activity proﬁles and system
training data. 2) The complex event detector based on the Siddhi CEP engine which operates on the real time volu-
metric ﬂow rate data from a smart water meter and also input from the oﬄine activity training data. and 3) A privacy
veriﬁcation system which ensures output data does not violate reasonable expectations of customer privacy. These are
depicted in Fig. 4. The oﬄine training process represents the ﬁrst major component. It provides per-household, and
hence privacy sensitive, classiﬁcations. This data allows the CEP, the second major component, to accurately deter-
mine which water activities are being used in real-time. The privacy sensitive outputs from this system are stored in a
secure database. The third major component, the privacy veriﬁer takes this sensitive data and formats and aggregates
it until the privacy level passes a conﬁgurable threshold. The sanitised but still valuable data is then freely available
to use in other water utility systems without any customer privacy concerns impeding operations.
5. Results
We use data generated by the Waterville iWidget project, (http://waterville.hrwallingford.com/waterville/), which
allows the user to specify their own assessment of the behaviour of consumption activities. The realisation of con-
sumption events is determined based on probabilities that are dependent on the hour of the day as well as the previous
states. Here we analyse 30 days worth of water volume consumption data sampled at each house water meter point
approximately every ﬁve minutes, for 25 houses with diﬀerent consumption proﬁles and a number of occupants. The
proﬁles used for the current data are shown in Table 1.
We evaluate the oﬄine training results by a) choosing the best possible mapping between the proﬁles learned
from the algorithm and the ground truth labels. If the case where more than one learned activities mapped to the
same label, the mapping allocates the closest VFR feature to the label, and classiﬁes the other as ‘Unknown’ (U).
The overall accuracy results, as well as characteristics of diﬀerent houses, are given in Table 2. We observe that the
algorithm exhibits high accuracy results for all activities, apart perhaps from the case of the dishwasher. This is due
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Fig. 4. CEP implementation.
Table 1. Ground truth of consumption proﬁles of water activities. MealP is meal and cooking preparation, WashUp is washing up, DishW is
dishwasher, WMach is Washing Machine and Drip is a dripping tap.
Consumption Bath Shower Toilet Tap MealP WashUp DishW WMach Drip Leak
Litres (High / Low / Normal) 100/60/80 100/30/40 6/6/6 8/5/6 20/12/15 15/10/10 25/25/25 80/80/80 0.01 1
Minutes (High / Low / Normal) 30/30/30 10/5/5 5/5/5 5/5/5 30/30/30 30/30/30 90/90/90 60/60/60 5/5/5 5/5/5
to a frequent variability of water consumption during one cycle of this ﬁxture. We note that as DBSCAN clusters
together neighbouring values, it mitigates the noise resulting from a variability in the VFR as well as the estimation of
the start time correction. We also notice that the activities of the running tap and washing up are less likely not to be
allocated to a label, as compared with other activities. This may also be attributed to the lack of suﬃcient granularity
of the ground truth proﬁle; a more granular activity labelling (e.g. washing up after lunch or dinner or afternoon tea)
may improve the mapping and the classiﬁcation results.
While the available dataset does not include the ground truth for each ﬁxture over time, and the performance of
the disaggregation algorithm cannot be tested, it is still possible to infer privacy and incongruence levels. We ﬁrst
make a few observations based on extended analysis of the KD between a daily / hourly interval EPD and the daily /
hourly average EPD for the 30 days. We deﬁne events as a combination of activities that are concurrently consuming
water (ON-ON duration). Further, the EPDs may include the zero (Z) event event, which signiﬁes zero aggregate
consumption, or may only focus only on non-zero events (NZ), in which case a better insight is obtained on (sparse)
activity variation, as the prevalence of the zero event dilutes other probabilities to low scores. A good example is
given in Fig. 5 where the following further observations are made: the spike at Day 15 (top left), which alarms a
low privacy protection level, is linked with an atypical EPD (bottom left) in which there is unusually high meal and
cooking preparation activity. Interestingly enough, a high washing up activity is only detected on the following day.
The high atypicality exhibited at particular times for Days 1, 11 and 21 (top left) is attributed to proportionally higher
leakage classiﬁcation, which would require further investigation. One reason may be erroneous disaggregation result
and detection leakage, which is visualised on the timeline on the bottom right of Fig. 5.
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Table 2. Accuracy of training process (in %) of identiﬁed VFRs of water activity proﬁles as compared to corresponding ground truth VFRs given
in Table 1. n(U) is the number of other identiﬁed activities that cannot be matched with a ground truth label (due to conﬂict with a better match).
A blank accuracy of a ground truth label means that it’s activity proﬁle was not identiﬁed during training.
House ID & proﬁle Bath Shower Toilet Tap MealP WashUp DishW WMach n(U)
2: High Usage, 1 people 98.4 96.9 98.3 98.7 89.1 15.6 95.7 2
3: High Usage, 2 people 98.7 96.9 80 96.6 98 97.2 82.7 97.5 6
4: High Usage, 3 people 97.6 99.7 95.5 95.7 98.8 88.4 98.4 3
5: High Usage, 4 people 99.1 99.1 95.9 80.4 95.2 99.1 3
7: Low Usage, 1 people 99.5 96.2 98.6 93.1 36.3 3
8: Low Usage, 2 people 99.9 99.9 98 95.9 54.3 97.4 6
9: Low Usage, 3 people 99.9 66.8 94.1 57.8 72.2 99.9 3
10: Low Usage, 4 people 99.3 96.2 95.3 65 24.5 93.2 4
12: Normal Usage, 1 people 99.7 60.9 96.7 82.9 93.8 8.3 98.1 3
13: Normal Usage, 2 people 99.3 88.6 96.9 94.8 64.4 2
14: Normal Usage, 3 people 99 88.8 96.2 95.9 97.9 4
15: Normal Usage, 4 people 98.8 80 97.5 64.8 44.1 97.9 4
17: Normal+Drip, 1 people 100 84.1 95.6 98.5 86.2 96.9 4
18: Normal+Drip, 2 people 99.4 60.4 73.7 92.3 97.5 97.8 6
19: Normal+Drip, 3 people 98.8 69.6 93.8 90.9 83.3 98.1 4
20: Normal+Drip, 4 people 99.5 88.1 77.4 97.7 95.9 79.8 99.9 4
22: Normal+Leak, 1 people 99.1 65.1 82.8 95.6 98.8 91.2 3
23: Normal+Leak, 2 people 99 99.8 84.9 99.6 5
24: Normal+Leak, 3 people 99.6 99.4 68.6 85.5 95.9 4
25: Normal+Leak, 4 people 99.2 91 97 94.9 98.1 7
6. Conclusions
This paper presents an unsupervised water ﬁxture proﬁle identiﬁcation and ﬁxture-level trace disaggregation method,
which is used for the purposes of privacy and incongruence analytics. These algorithms are designed for implementa-
tion on the Complex Event Processor (CEP) of WSO2, employed by the IceWater project.
With current activity identiﬁcation results exhibiting high accuracy, future work will be extended in a number
of directions. 1) Disaggregation, privacy and incongruence algorithms will be evaluated using real data, and the
eﬀect of sampling frequency and building-block aggregation will be studied. 2) Hourly consumption predictions and
HMM may be used to improve the detection and privacy algorithms. 3) A detection of complex anomalies such as
cyber-physical security attacks may be tested in a system simulation. From an implementation point of view, while a
single stream processing beneﬁts from the CEP’s ancillary functions (input/output adapters and time or event-based
sliding/batch windows), a more involved CEP usage will investigate multi-modal data fusion of water, electricity, and
wearable data aiming to improve the performance of event detection algorithms.
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